Mensch, ist das Deutsch: Mit Ankündigung und Frist umziehen. Habt ihr schon einen Nachsendeauftrag eingerichtet 😉

So wie damals Otto Schily. Liegt das irgendwie am Amt?

OHA, das ist ein sehr spannender Ansatz! Danke fürs Teilen!

Yeah, that’s a very useful exception.

Operator overloading is adding complexity, making code subtly harder to read. The most important lesson for code is: It should primarily be written to be easy to read by humans because if code is not trash, it will be read way more often than written.

If it is just the location, then it could be spoofed.

If it is something that requires physical presence, then you need both devices to communicate with each other. If it is not done via QR code (like some online banking do), then both devices need to be connected, e.g. via WiFi or Bluetooth. In this case, if an attacker controls one of the devices (that’s the class of attacks 2FA should prevent you from), the attacker probably controls both devices. So what’s the point then?

I guess if there is WiFi, he won’t even need a mobile data plan, so he could safe lots of money.

How would MS Authenticator make it any better than TOTP?

To break TOTP, the attacker would need to:

a) be able to observe the initial exchange of the TOTP secrets. To do that, the attacker needs access to the victim’s computer (on user level) at that specific time they set up TOTP. TOTP is a TOFU concept and thus not designed to protect against that. However, if the attacker controls the victim’s computer at that time, the victim is screwed anyways even before setting up 2FA.

b) have access to the TOTP app’s secret storage and to the victim’s login credentials (e.g. by phishing). If the attacker can gain that level of access, they would also have access to the Microsoft Authenticator’s secret storage, so there is no benefit of the Microsoft app.

On the other hand, Microsoft Authenticator is a very huge app (>100MB is huge for an authenticator app, Aegis is just 6MB, FreeOTP+ 11MB), i.e. it brings a large attack surface, especially by connecting to the internet.

I don’t think Microsoft Authenticator brings security benefits over a clean and simple TOTP implementation.

If it is just TOTP, you can use any other TOTP app, such as Aegis or FreeOTP+.

And no, Microsoft cannot be trusted on not doing anything bad. The app is full of trackers and has an excessive list of permissions it “requires”.

For comparison, Aegis and FreeOTP+ work without trackers and way less permissions.

Microsoft has a long track record of leaks. Just naming the 2 most prominent:

1. Microsoft Edge leaks every single URL to Microsoft servers (source)
2. There are lots of reports that Microsoft had their general key stolen and not even notify it for months. It is unclear who had acces to that key. This is putting anyone at risk who uses any Microsoft product. (See for example here)

Are you forced to use their app or are they just very insistently trying to trick you into using it? I.e., have you tried with Bitwarden or any other TOTP capable app?

It might depend on configuration. In the only case of Microsoft enforced 2FA I know of, it is just TOTP. Microsoft’s web interface nudges (tries to trick) you into using the MS Authenticator app, but that app is not needed. You can use any TOTP capable 2FA app, e.g. Aegis or FreeOTP+, both of which are also available through F-Droid and don’t require internet connection.

“Diplomjodler” sounds German so probably different laws apply…

With Gtk, I have seen some issues with rarely used parts of the API, but that should not be relevant to your rather simple use case.

Mostly minor improvement, such as the fossify phone app grouping by date in the call history